Enforcement Proceedings in the Algorithmic Era - Legal Limits and Prospects of Random Assignment of Enforcement Officers (Bailiffs)

Abstract

The paper analyses the random and even allocation of enforcement cases to enforcement officers under Section 55 of the Enforcement Order as an organisational-procedural tool of impartiality, introduced by the Great Amendment effective 1 April 2017. Methodologically, the authors combine normative and institutional analyses and assess the “governance” of the allocation mechanism: input stratification via “baskets” and its risks, the change-control regime and logging of interventions, auditability, and reviewability. At the same time, it carefully distinguishes random selection from artificial intelligence. The text examines the legitimacy of the aim to sever ties between large creditors and individual enforcement officers, and the measure’s constitutional sustainability amid ongoing review before the Constitutional Court. The key finding is that sustainability depends on a high degree of reviewability and effective procedural safeguards in both the selection itself and the officer’s subsequent conduct (the court’s inquiry and instruction powers, state and chamber oversight, and the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic). The authors also note significant benefits of the regulation (e.g. concentrating a single debtor’s cases with one bailiff, reducing duplications and simplifying communication). The paper concludes by summarising impacts on legal practice and presenting possible de lege ferenda proposals.